



Military Incursion into Politics: A Comparative Analysis of Civil-Military Relationship in Pakistan and Nigeria

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Abstract:

Purpose:

Objective number one in the current study seeks to understand the role of historical developments in shaping the direction of democracy with a testable hypothesis one having that the Military intervention in politics is a result of bad politics exercised by politicians while addressing problems caused by low political culture, this paper explores answers to that question in a context of renewed option rule in Pakistan and Nigeria.

Methodology:

This Research paper will provide an overview of the major historical events since the independence of these two countries to be in a position to evaluate the role of the military in politics. The Nigerian military's poor human rights record has had a devastating impact on its effectiveness.

Findings:

Severe abuse of civilian communities, from the Ogoni (in the mid-1990s) to Odi (1999) and Zaki Biam (2001), and more recent extrajudicial assassinations, frequently in the background of contradicting militant and separatist groups from Boko Haram and the Islamic.

Implication:

Movement of Nigeria (IMN) In recent days, Pakistan has had legitimate power to encompass the tenures of the chiefs of staff of the army, navy, and air force.



INTRODUCTION

Nigeria is once again in the headlines for the wrong reasons. In addition to the Boko Haram insurgency, the country has been rocked by multiple outbursts of banditry, kidnapping, and violence this year. Approximately 600 students were kidnapped between December 2020 and March of this year alone. Then, a few days ago, unknown gunmen shot to death a member of the ruling All Progressives Congress party. Nigerians are aghast and appalled that the government of Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari (who was elected partly on his pedigree as a retired general and promises to crush insurgents) has been unable to suppress the insecurity. However, the long-term causes are rooted in the country's era under military rule in the 20th century. Nigeria's military is ironically the cause of, and the solution to, many of the country's security problems. Although Nigeria transitioned to democracy 22 years ago, the consequences of decisions made by prior military dictatorships still influence events in contemporary Nigeria. Discontent regarding economic inequality, corruption, and the overly centralized structure of the Nigerian state has simmered for decades. However, prior military governments kept a lid on them—through ruthless force rather than by addressing their underlying cause. Though the current intervention by the Army is rightfully uncalled for, the institution has also played an invaluable role in the past. It is to be noted that during the PTI era, when Pakistan wanted to trade crude oil under easier conditions and required prompt dollar dispersal due to diminishing reserves, the COAS interceded with Saudi Arabia. The help was considered a routine civil-military collaboration. The then-prime minister Imran Khan did not look into the constitutional room for the army chief's intervention but was instead appreciative of his assistance. Pakistan is an example of how an apolitical institution of the Army can be gradually pulled into the political arena, among other causes, because of

the deficiencies in political institutions, drawing the military to become a significant factor in the decision-making process.

Then again, the National Security Policy (NSP) 2022 brought forward during Imran Khan's administration further increased the space for such actions. In light of the NSP, the economic security of a state is the cornerstone of national security. Therefore, the policy makes room for such maneuverings to safeguard the economy if the situation demands it. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) can be taken as an example in this regard, where the country's military has played a fundamental role in ensuring the smooth flow of the project. On the flip side, as opined by Umar Farooq, "Pakistan military is in love with its image...as a savior of the nation". Though the constitution provides no room for the military in the political arena, the impression of the Army as an invincible power in the country consolidates the credibility of its political capacity. Besides, the institution draws global legitimacy based on the Pakistan Army's role during the Cold War and the "Global War on Terror".

"Nevertheless, ISPR has repeatedly asserted that the Pakistan Army has "nothing to do with politics." While the military has long maintained to be apolitical, it sure is wary of the country's economic predicament. Also, the lack of credibility of the current political stakeholders leaves Pakistan with fewer choices. The country's political leaders must come at par with the Army's nationalistic stance and refrain from giving in to their internal tug-of-war for the military to steer clear of politics and for the civilian government to sustain the sanctity of the armed forces. However, given the inter-party political dynamics, such a change does not happen soon. The recent overture reeks of the country's desperate economic situation. Moreover, it is also reflective of the country's domestic dynamics. Notwithstanding the speeding up of the IMF's loan payout, how successful the telephone exchange will be for Pakistan's financial standing in the long run is yet to be seen. On the other hand, economic stability is central to internal security, ensuring it remains the foremost concern for the country's military. Apart from that, the Army does not seem interested in being saddled with the additional obligation of direct rule.

METHODS

Legitimacy Causes of Military Interventions in Nigerian Politics. The article examines the causes of military interventions in the politics of Nigeria during two periods when the civilians were in charge of the country but were eventually disposed of by the military. The first period, 1960 to 1966, was right after independence, and the second one, 1979 to 1985, was when Nigeria was under Shehu Shagari, another civilian politician who took over when the military disengaged from politics in 1979.

Causes of Military Interventions in Nigerian Politics 1960 – 1966. The possible legitimate causes of the causes of the downfall of the first governments in favor of the military are as follows:

a. Socioeconomic Conditions in Nigeria 1960-1966. The economy was not in good shape in the early 1960s and only underwent a dramatic turn after the discovery of oil in the Niger Delta. Poverty, unemployment, and inflation were worsened by widespread corruption during the civilian government of Tafawa Balewa.

b. Political Conditions in Nigeria 1960 –1966. In the years leading to independence, politicians formed political parties on an ethnic basis, creating a very intensive rivalry and competition among and between themselves. This act made the country practice tribal, regional, and religious politics right from the beginning, making even coalitions challenging to manage, henceforth collapsing within shorter periods. In the elections of 1959, which led to the first post-colonial government, the Northern People's Congress (NPC) formed a coalition government with the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), while the Action Group (AG) became the official opposition. All these parties, either in government or in the opposition, had an ideological similarity; the NPC was Northern - Muslim, NCNC was Igbo-Christian, and AG was Yoruba-Christian. In the following elections in 1964, two fragile alliances were formed, comprising the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) on the one hand and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). The NNA had NPC and NNPP in its ranks, while the UPGA was formed by AG and NCNC, implying that the alliances formed in 1960 were nonexistent in 1964. These



alliances saturated ethnicity, discarded patriotism as the pivot of political gravity, and made politicians devote much of their resources to fighting each other rather than building the country. It partly invited the military to come in to save the country.

In addition to ethical politics, Azikiwe Nnamdi noted that during the period, there was a general tendency for politicians to rush government measures in parliament without providing enough time for the members to study and evaluate them critically. That weakened the parliament and led to undemocratic adoption policies. The frequency at which Members of Parliament crossed from one party to another undermined the political process and created a political crisis in the country. For instance, in January 1952, fourteen members of NCNC and six of its sympathizers crossed over to NPC; in 1964, a total of eight MPs of AG crossed over to NPC. This act of carpet crossing without going back to seek a fresh mandate was unfair to the electorate and weakened democracy.

As the elections in the country were based on adult suffrage, in the northern region of Nigeria, females were excluded from voting. It created uneven representation in the house in favor of the North, which made another member agitate for constitutional amendments to rectify the problem but which the Northern politicians could not heed. The political challenges in the 1960s that created fertile grounds for the military to intervene in the country's politics can be traced from the elections in 1959 that were marred with electoral irregularities. It was worsened by an imbalance created in the polity by the result of the 1961 plebiscite, in which Nigeria lost its Southern Cameroon region to Cameroon. The elections of 1965 further worsened the political crisis in that the Action Group Party was outmaneuvered from its stronghold of Nigeria's Western Region by the Nigerian National Democratic Party. All these disturbing political problems eroded state legitimacy and formed a basis for military intervention.

Nigeria in the period 1979-1983. This period is popularly known as the second republic in Nigerian politics, which came about when the military disengaged from politics after a long period (1966-1979). It was a time in the history of Nigeria when Shehu Shagari dominated politics.

a. Socioeconomic Conditions in Nigeria 1979-1983. On the socioeconomic front, the government of Shagari was a total failure. The foreign reserves stood at \$7.5 billion at the time of the military handover; it dwindled to less than \$1 by the end he was overthrown. On the other hand, external debts grew to \$12 billion, which placed the country under debt repayment pressure. There were significant slums in industrial and agricultural production due to the non-availability of foreign currency to purchase the much-needed raw materials and equipment for industrial production and the general neglect of the agriculture sector since the early 1970s. It increased the prices of goods in the country, which caused widespread hardships for the masses. It was reported during 1979 and 1981 that staple food prices increased by 500%. The slums, particularly in the agricultural sector, led to mass rural-urban migrations, placing a heavy burden on the urban authorities in providing essential services and increasing housing prices, among others. The budget deficit rose to 4.9 billion Naira's by the time he was overthrown in 1983. Public servants were reported to have unpaid salaries and wages for six to eighteen months. It greatly affected their welfare, lowered their living standards, and created tensions between the government and its servants. Despite the financial crisis prevailing in the country, more than 2 billion Naira were misappropriated on the proposed new federal capital Abuja between 1980 and 1983, and 9.2 billion Naira was wasted on importing luxurious consumer items from the Western world and corruption, notably by leading NPN officials became embedded in government in which such individuals turned millionaires overnight.

b. Political Conditions in Nigeria 1979-1983. The situation and the actions of the politicians during the early 1960s, which led to the overthrow of the first civilian governments, were evident even in the second democratic government that emerged after military disengagement in 1979. The government that emerged from the elections was of a coalition form in which the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) formed the government, and the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and the Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP) formed the opposition. The alliances became fragile as the NPP joined other parties against the NPN in the 1983 elections. Apart from alliances with well-established parties, the NPN, to ensure victory, allied itself with radical groups,



particularly those from Kaduna, headed by a radical journalist then, Adamu Chroma, who, after the election, was awarded the portfolio of agriculture ministry in which 1.6 billion Naira meant for the green revolution by the government went through. The radicals that penetrated the government undermined it by embezzling public funds, grabbing jobs and influencing government policy in their favor. In addition to those political facts, the 1979 and 1983 elections were rigged in favor of the NPN. However, the rigging was massive in the latter in which the Electoral Commission and the police reinforced other government machinery in NPN's bid to uproot the opposition from its political bases in Kano, Oyo, Anambra, Ondo, Imo, and Ogun states. Besides official daylight rigging, there was nationwide harassment directed at the opposition in the form of arrests and physical assaults. The widespread street protests led to an untold number of deaths, arrests, and loss of variable items. Such political bankruptcy during Shagari's government significantly reduced support for his government. It downgraded state legitimacy to its lowest to the extent that a military takeover was celebrated as a form of relief by the Nigerian people at the end of 1983.

Military Rule Ends, Democracy Emerges. In 1999, Nawaz Sharif's second run as the Prime Minister ended through a bloodless coup. Pakistan's Army Chief of Staff, General Pervez Musharraf, came to power and became the President of Pakistan. His rule started in 1999 and ended in 2008. Almost ten years of military rule made it very difficult for Pakistan to develop the political and economic environment that enabled democracy to take root within the country. Apart from that, the international relations that Pakistan developed with the United States during the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks increased the military's power and role like never before within Pakistan. As discussed in the preceding chapter on Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, and Nawaz Sharif, factors such as the struggle to diminish military power, lack of ability to create political and economic stability as well as international interference allowed the military to legitimize their existence, not only in politics but also in the decision-making process. This chapter discusses the years from 1999 to 2017, focusing on General Pervez Musharraf's military leadership, the democratic rule of President Asif Ali Zardari, and lastly, the third term of Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister. This chapter will also discuss how the military has adopted a new way of using its power to influence politics behind the curtains.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Pervez Musharraf: The Rise and the Fall. Pervez Musharraf's military rule from 1999-2008 can be described as a "brand of lifestyle-liberalism mixed with a different brand of dictatorial politics." It was also "unfashionable" and looked down upon by other states in the international arena as the era of military interventions had ended, putting Musharraf's position into trouble. The United States also imposed automatic coup-related sanctions on Pakistan under "section 508 of the annual foreign assistance appropriations act." Unlike his predecessors, Musharraf did not declare martial law after dismissing the elected government of Nawaz Sharif in 1999. Musharraf chose the title of Chief Executive instead of being a martial law administrator. As a Chief Executive, Musharraf had considerable support from Westernized elites, radical civil society and NGO groups, and new Prime Minister M.Z. Jamali was elected in an election controlled by the military. All these factors enabled Musharraf to create a government consisting of a carefully selected political elite and a group of bureaucrats and technocrats. Since the judiciary has a history of endorsing and working with military rules, the higher judiciary gave Musharraf "three years after his coup to hold elections." In 2002, Musharraf fulfilled the promise and held elections in which a "pro-military alliance won a plurality of seats, while a coalition of Islamist parties made a surprisingly strong showing." Responding to the elections, 18 Pakistan's political parties formed an Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD). However, Musharraf was able to neutralize the effectiveness of this alliance through the court's verdict in his favor. In the same year, Pervez Musharraf also changed the Constitution to strengthen his position by simultaneously announcing himself as the Chief of the Army and the President of Pakistan. In 2003, Musharraf created an agreement with Islamic opposition parties, bringing the constitutional changes before the Parliament and assuring Musharraf would resign from his military rank or position in 2005. In 2004, the government created



the National Security Council (NSC) that legitimized the military's role and enabled it to supervise the civilian cabinet. This Council aimed to institutionalize the governance role of the army. Apart from this change, Musharraf also bent the rules and brought his close ally, Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz, to the position of Prime Minister. This action marginalized opposition parties and signaled that Musharraf had not complied with the agreed-upon rules.

The 9/11 Attacks and Musharraf's Secure Dominance. Like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought profits for the Zia ul Haq administration, the 9/11 attacks in 2001 saved the Musharraf administration from the downfall in the era of the unwanted coup. When Musharraf came to power, the United States placed a sanction that stopped its financial assistance to Pakistan; however, after 9/11, the United States considered Pakistan as a vital ally in the international anti-terrorism coalition and maintained that "Musharraf's government is the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan." Moreover, Congress removed restrictions and allowed large-scale United States financial aid to Pakistan. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, "the Bush Administration also refrained from expressing any strong public criticisms of Pakistan's internal practices," yet argued that it is necessary to strengthen civilian political institutions. Due to this alliance with the United States, Musharraf became an influential leader whose military dictatorship was legitimized because of the "continuous waivers of coup-related aid restrictions," hindering the process of democratization in Pakistan. Even if the democratic political institutions were strengthened, Pakistan's political parties and civil society became destabilized and weak as military influence became profound. According to Pakistani Political Analyst Najam Sethi, "Musharraf's major policy shifts after 9/11 have come through compulsion by external pressure or events and that, while the direction of Pakistan's policy change has been appropriate, the momentum of change is too slow and awkward and unsure to constitute a critical and irreversible mass." This support from the United States, made Musharraf powerful. However, he was a marginal satisfier" that did only minimum of what was expected of him. Therefore, many political analysts and correspondents claim that it is essential that the "country's secular political parties" be allowed to emerge and function in the system so that the country can become a stabilized and enduring democracy. Similar to the Zia ul Haq era, foreign aid from Western countries legitimized military rule and diminished the chances for democratic institutions to take root in Pakistan. Even though the United States claims that it will help restore democratic institutions so that Pakistan can thrive economically and become a moderate Muslim State by negotiating with the military. However, I argue that United States financial assistance enables it to monitor political developments by using the military as its implementer. As a result, "Pakistan's fragile democratic institutions continuously remain under threat from the authoritarian influences of the country's powerful military and quasi-feudal economic structures."

Lack of Social Reforms Under Musharraf. Unlike the preceding military coups, Musharraf faced challenges from ethnic groups within Pakistan. In 2005, there was increased unrest between the military and tribal groups of Baluchistan due to the rape of women by the army in the regions. The Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) attacked various infrastructures, projects, and staff, and the local tribal leaders demanded political autonomy as well as control over the region's natural resources. However, Musharraf objected to the political autonomy of the Baluchi people and engaged in a counter-insurgency paramilitary operation, leading to an increase in human rights violations and a humanitarian crisis. In addition to tensions with tribal groups, Musharraf also started to lose the support of NGOs, trade unions, and human rights activists. Women and minority groups lacked equality within the political system, and women had difficulty voting, as well as not being granted to run for office due to oppression from social and religious conservatives. The tide of a shift towards democracy in the international realm took its toll in Pakistan, as small institutions started to address numerous human rights violations such as "forced disappearances," torture, and discrimination against women and religious minorities. NGOs were allowed to publish critical material, and trade unions could exist but not engage in strikes or collective bargaining. As international politics changed, so did domestic politics within Pakistan, which threatened Musharraf's rule, leading to his dismissal in 2008. Apart from human rights violations of NGOs and activists, the military placed censorship



on most material published by the media. If the media broadcasted anything that questioned the authority of armed forces, then the media outlets and journalists were harassed by the military officials, suppressed by blasphemy law, or shut down. In 2002, foreign press corps were attacked by angry mobs, and Indian journalists were not granted visas. In the same year, Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was kidnapped and murdered by Islamic fundamentalists. Apart from Islamic fundamentalists, journalists suffered from physical attacks from hired thugs and police. In 2003, Shaheen Sehba, an editor, was pressured to resign because he published an article against the intelligence agencies. In 2005, journalists could not report the crisis taking place in the tribal areas near the Afghanistan borders as the vehicles of reporters were fired upon, killing two and injuring two journalists. The continuous tribal area troubles, human rights violations, and the lack of freedom of the press decreased the support for Musharraf's regime. I argue that these events encouraged these groups to create an alliance that became essential during the Lawyers Movement that brought an end to Musharraf's military coup in 2008.

The Lawyers Movement, Ending Musharraf's Coup. In 2005, Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was sworn into office under the Musharraf Provisional Council Order. While in office, Chaudhry worked to expand the role of Pakistan's judiciary and addressed cases regarding public interest and cases requesting to check government power and authority. In 2006, the Chief Justice subpoenaed representatives of the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency for connections to the global war on terror. Musharraf took these reforms as a challenge to his authority and suspended the Chief Justice due to his growing support for his reforms. He placed the Chief Justice under house arrest as Chaudhry refused to resign. There was continuing media coverage of the Chief Justice's dismissal and house arrest; in major cities, lawyers protested while Supreme Court judges publicly supported the Chief Justice. When the media showed the Chief Justice being "dragged by his hair from a policeman," public support came from the provinces of Punjab and Sindh, as well as professionals, students, NGOs, and other civil society groups, turning it into a mass movement. In 2007, Musharraf announced martial law and suspended the Constitution and parliament. The judges faced suspension as they refused to take the new oath, and the media outlets were taken off the air as they refused to stop broadcasting stories of the protest. The public that engaged in protests was beaten and arrested. As the domestic and international pressure increased, Musharraf resigned in the summer of 2008.

The Democratic Governance of Asif Ali Zardari. 2008, General Pervez Musharraf's military regime ended, paving the way for free and fair elections that brought President Asif Ali Zardari to office. However, in the struggle for the balance of power post-Musharraf era, the actions of elected political officials have backfired, which proves that if not directly, then indirectly, the military still runs the show. For example, in his first six months in office, President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani pushed to reduce the power of Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agency, which has been involved in politics for many years. Zardari pushed to "bring the ISI under the supervision of the Interior Ministry," yet they backtracked. The military must have seen it as an attempt to curtail their power. Instead, the army General Ashfaq Kayani, ex-ISI head, claimed that he supported the civilian-led democracy but rejected Zardari's decision to give control of ISI to the Interior Ministry.

General Kayani argued that "the military should be allowed to run its affairs without the interference of the civilian government" and replaced the ISI director general with his associate, Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha. This decision to make Pasha the director created tensions between President Zardari and the military. In the aftermath of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which killed 173 people, Zardari was incapable of convincing Pasha to work with investigators in New Delhi. This lack of ability to shift power away from the military and ISI shows that establishing control over the military is difficult, as the interests of the military become threatened. Therefore, the military takes any measure to secure its interests. The Zardari government pushed continuously to establish monitoring and check over military Establishment. For example, the "Memo Gate" Scandal of 2011 challenged the governance of Zardari as the military accused him of delivering a memo through the Pakistani Ambassador Hussain Haqqani to United States Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Admiral Mullen. The memo delivered by Haqqani to Mullen presented the fears of a military coup after the killing of Osama bin Laden. According to the

memo, Zardari claimed that "the Pakistan army being unable to bear the humiliation of the Bin Laden raid carried out by the American forces, can lead to the military coup" and therefore, the assistance of the Obama Administration was needed to end Chief of Staff General Kayani's and ISI Chief General Pasha's "brinkmanship aimed at bringing down the civilian apparatus." The memo promised to punish political officials who were responsible for harboring Osama bin Laden as well as gave the United States permission to carry out operations to capture and kill al Qaeda and Taliban officials. According to Jaffrelot (2015), the memo was supposed to remain a secret, but Mansoor Ijaz, an intermediary of Haqqani, published the memo in the Financial Times in 2011. The military accused Haqqani, a close ally of Zardari, of drafting the memo and urging Ijaz to present it to Mullen. Haqqani and Zardari both deny involvement in the drafting of the memo, and political analysts claim that it is a conspiracy against them by the military. Dawn, the newspaper's political commentator, Cyril Almeida, asserted that "the boys (the army establishment) are up to their tricks again." The memo case was taken to the Supreme Court, which led to Haqqani's resignation and exile to the United States as he claimed his life was under threat and that he did not want to go back to Pakistan to encounter a mob. In addition, President Zardari's power also weakened as corruption charges emerged against him, allowing the military to continuously practice its control over economic and foreign policy and, indirectly, political affairs.

The Return of Nawaz Sharif. In 2013, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif came to power after free and fair elections that were conducted nationwide. Nawaz Sharif came to office with a plan to create good relations with neighboring rival India, ensure economic growth, and stabilize democracy within Pakistan. As a step towards good relations with India, Sharif went to Prime Minister Modi's swearing-in ceremony in 2014, engaged in talks regarding control over terrorism, and "resumed the stalled peace process." Dawn newspaper notes that there has been growth in trade between the two countries since the peace talks, and it was predicted that in 2015, it would touch the 5 billion dollar mark. However, in 2014, the decision by Nawaz Sharif "to put General Musharraf, a prior military dictator, on trial for suspending the constitution" led to tensions between civil and military relations. Just a few days after Sharif decided to trail Musharraf, opposition party leader Imran Khan took to the streets, claiming that the elections that brought Sharif to office were rigged. These staged protests delayed the scheduled visits by China's leader regarding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project. They weakened the government, urging Nawaz Sharif to depend on the army chief "to stave off the threat of a coup." The military was unwilling to allow their former general to be humiliated by Sharif's government. However, support for Sharif's decision gained much support from parliament, and opposition parties also stood by Sharif, which hurt civil-military relations. Despite the successful peace talks between India and Pakistan in 2014, 2015 witnessed the rivalry between these two countries again.

Political analysts argue that for years, the military has been justifying its control over foreign and national policy by claiming that India is still an enemy and that these peace talks between Sharif and Modi were challenging the interests of the military. As a result, attacks were initiated by the Pakistan military on Indian army bases in Kashmir, causing tensions between the two countries. In response to these attacks, India's Prime Minister Modi decided not to take part in the 19th SAARC summit hosted by Pakistan in Islamabad. Furthermore, Prime Minister Modi also avoided talking with Prime Minister Sharif regarding the Kashmir Issue. In addition, these attacks on Indian army bases also led to a showdown between India and Pakistan at the United Nations General Assembly over Kashmir in 2016. Pakistan argued that it still wants to build peace with India, but "it is not possible by resolving the Kashmir issue."

On the other hand, India accused Pakistan of being a terrorist state and of "nurturing, peddling and exporting terrorism." India's Foreign Minister Swaraj claimed that all of the allegations made by Sharif regarding human rights violations in Kashmir are baseless and that Jammu and Kashmir will remain a part of India. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif changed the Chief of Army three times, but each time, "he picked dark horse for the coveted post, hoping to tilt the balance of power towards his civilian government."



In 2017, Sharif was ousted from office after being charged with corruption that was accused against him by the Panama Papers scandal that claimed Sharif had offshore businesses and capital under his children's names. The military did not oust Sharif, but the Supreme Court claimed Sharif to be a dishonest leader. However, political analysts also assert that even though the military did not have direct interference, senior and middle-rankers in the military intelligence agencies were feeding the media with anti-Sharif material. The Panama Papers scandal is essential because it unfolded during the unresolved significant problems between the civil-military. Most importantly, the joint investigation team (JIT) investigating the case against Sharif mainly consisted of members of ISI and Military Intelligence (MI). It can be argued from these events that the military used the scandal to destabilize the government in the sense of Ghosal's "power without no responsibility and accountability." The Nigerian Military's Contribution to Nation-Building 1960-2010 It can be stated without a shadow of a doubt that the Nigerian Military has contributed significantly to nation-building in Nigeria. First and perhaps most important is that the Nigerian military has provided political leadership at various times at the federal and state levels. A testament to the strength and dominance of Military leadership in Nigeria is the fact that in what can be termed as the post Military era (1999- 2018), two generals from the Military have emerged as Presidents of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in the persons of Olusegun Obasanjo and Muhammed Buhari. As stated earlier in this work, training in a military academy or institute can prepare an individual for leadership in political life. It is a globally tested theory. The ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, received military training at the prestigious Sandhurst Military Academy before transforming Dubai into a global destination. Prince William and Prince Harry of the British Monarchy received military training and offered their services to the British Military. Indeed, it was the discovery of Prince Harry's identity in Afghanistan while serving with special forces that caused him to be whisked back home because of security concerns. The rigors and discipline of Military training make an individual smart, mentally alert, self-sufficient, disciplined, organized, challenging, and resilient.

The Nigerian Military ruled by decrees. It meant that no matter the scale of a project a Military administration intended to undertake, if the feasibility studies were proper, it could implement the project, avoiding the approval and execution bottlenecks peculiar to a civilian administration. The table above and available economic data indicate that the Nigerian Military ruled in times of financial abundance. The attendant result was that substantial mega projects dotted the Nigerian landscape. Sadly, due to corruption, graft, poor planning, and several other factors, several of these projects ended up as White Elephant projects. Notable among the mega projects undertaken by the Nigerian Military are:

1. The Ajaokuta Steel Mill.
2. The Construction of the Niger Bridge.
3. The Construction of the Third Mainland Bridge in Lagos.
4. The Aluminum Smelter Company of Nigeria (ALSCON) is now (RUSAL).
5. The construction of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja.
6. The four Petroleum Refineries.

In intervening in political life, the Nigerian military has consistently cited the excesses of the political class, insecurity, instability, poverty, corruption, and indiscipline as reasons for its intervention. To its credit, the military has made bold attempts to tackle these problems. General Buhari, for instance, in his first sojourn as a Military Head of State, instituted a War against Indiscipline. Civil servants were forced to go to work early, and Nigerians were forced to join queues and wait in line. He also implemented stringent austerity measures to tackle the prevailing economic issues of his day.

Building Nigeria's Image. A nation's image is essential in its relations and interactions with the Committee of Nations. Fortunately, the Nigerian Military has provided vibrant leadership for the nation at critical points in its history. This vibrant leadership has bolstered Nigeria's image on the foreign scene. Nigeria is the most significant African contributor to UN Peacekeeping missions. Nigeria has also been extensively involved in peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts at the Continental and regional levels. Right from Independence, Nigeria

has placed Africa as the Centre-piece of her Foreign policy. Okoro (2002) states that despite the regime in control, Africa has been the cornerstone of Nigeria's foreign policy.⁷¹ This notion has dominated Nigeria's foreign policy calculations since the 1960s. This logical conclusion arises from the unique characteristics of the Nigerian State and its Leadership position in Africa. The Nigerian military has been rigorously involved in many of these Africa-centered foreign policy calculations. Okoro (2002) states further that Nigeria's foreign policy and relations with African States can be discussed under the following issue areas:

1. The anti-colonial and apartheid struggle.
2. Pan-African Trade and Commercial Relations.
3. Technical Aid Corps Scheme.
4. Conflict resolution.
5. Environmental Protection.
6. Debt Cancellation and Restitution.

Nigeria's efforts and financial commitment in the West African Sub-region towards Peacekeeping through the Ecomog Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) are praiseworthy. The ECOMOG has helped restore peace and stability to war-torn Liberia and Sierra Leone. Liberia has returned to democratic rule and is still facing the arduous task of post-war reconstruction. The Nigerian Military has also contributed to policy-making and Local government reform, which have, in turn, made Nigeria the Nation it is today. According to Ogburn J and Olukoshi (1991), the period since June 1988, when Major-General Ike Nwachukwu (rtd) made his maiden speech as Nigeria's Minister of External Affairs, has witnessed a significant increase in the interest demonstrated by students and observers of Nigeria's Foreign Policy on the question of economics and diplomacy in the contemporary world system. In that speech, Nwachukwu stated, among other things, that the Federal Government had decided to make "economic diplomacy" a new, additional plank of Nigeria's foreign policy. In his view, the decision meant that, thenceforth, a deliberate effort would be to shift the gear of focus towards a "new" orientation in which an attempt will be made to use foreign policy instruments to attain domestic objectives. The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) is another example of a policy implemented by a Military regime to alleviate the suffering of Nigerians. According to Bassey (2005), from 1976, local government assumed a national significance. It followed the 1976 nationwide local government reform. It was the first time in Nigeria's post-colonial history that local government systems were reorganized at that level. The 1976 reforms provided a panacea for most problems that engulfed the erstwhile system. It introduced the Cabinet system with democratic principles. However, between 1979 and 1983, some of the problems resurfaced, thus compelling the new military regime of Buhari to embark on another reform in 1984. The regime settled for the Sole-Administrator system. The coup of Ibrahim Babangida in August 1985, however, scuttled the experiment. General Babangida carried out yet another nationwide reform, which gave the local governments all the paraphernalia of a presidential system of government. On coming to power in November 1993, General Sani Abacha re-enacted the cabinet system, which was replaced with the caretaker committee system by General Abu-Bakr in 1998.

According to Iheduru (2015), The painful history of dictatorship or what one analyst called "the soldiers of fortune" in Nigeria transformed an organizational imperative for the military, in an address at the commissioning of some NA officers and soldiers' accommodation at Abuja on 26 November 2012 (whose audience included the minister of defense, the high military command, and senior civilian officials in strategic positions in the defense ministry and the National Assembly), Lt.-Gen. Ihejirika detailed the paranoia and mutual distrust injected into the Nigerian Army by the "locusts in the army" during "that dark era" as part of a deliberate strategy to shackle the army to decay and to perpetuate the regimes' hold on political power. For much of the period of military rule, enlisted officers and soldiers of lower ranks saw little direct benefit from military rule and, therefore, preferred a return to rule by civilians who would be careful not to offend the military too much for fear of coups. When President Olusegun Obasanjo assumed power in 1999, many Nigerians genuinely expected him to fundamentally transform the state security apparatus at the same time that he was using his post-military national and international



goodwill to extricate Nigeria from its Abacha-era pariah status and reintegrate the country into the world community. A day after his inauguration, he dismissed 93 officers "who had been tainted by politics" or who could pose a threat to the new order. He also initiated an 18-month "military professionalization program" in collaboration with the United States and the United Kingdom and frequently reshuffled the military leadership.

Security and Counter-Terrorism. According to the researchers, the Nigerian Military has performed creditably well in maintaining peace and security in Nigeria. The Military has performed well against traditional confrontation. Where there have, however, been gaping gaps have been its response to Militancy in the Niger Delta and Terrorism, especially in the North East. Earlier in this paper, it was stated that Major Nzeogwu Kaduna was the first officer trained in Military Intelligence in his day. Hence, the Nigerian military must train its officers to meet modern challenges. Military bases must also be established in the South East, South, and South West to facilitate an even distribution of military personnel among Nigeria's different geo-political zones. It would also ensure Military presence in the event of unrest and crisis in any of these geo-political zones. The nation's borders have proven to be porous, and herders, militants, and Almajiris enter and leave the country at will. According to (The Crisis Group, 2016), the Nation's military is in shambles with poorly trained officers, outdated and obsolete equipment, and widespread corruption among the Nation's military echelon. It leaves serious room for concern. The question must be asked, in the event of the outbreak of a war of global proportions, how prepared would the Nigerian Military be to respond to the demands placed on it? The Nigerian army's confrontation with Boko haram, perhaps more than any other conflict in its history, exposed this rotten underbelly. According to the International Crisis Group, Nigeria's military is in distress. Once among the strongest and a mainstay of regional peacekeeping, it has become a flawed force. The initially slow, heavy-handed response to the Islamist Boko Haram Insurgency raised serious concerns, and its human rights record underscores a grave disconnect with civilians.

Until recently, the military was under-resourced, with comparatively low budgets, disbursed irregularly and unpredictably. From 2000 to 2008, the Military's budget was less than 3 percent of overall government expenditure. From 2009 to 2014, it increased to an average of 7.2 percent of government spending (\$ 5-\$6 billion). However, as in the past, this was still allocated disproportionately to recurrent expenditures, leaving very little for crucial capital investment. Given current global trends in international security, the attitude of Nigeria's leaders to its military would amount to sticking its head in the sand. Defense experts generally agree that there is a need for far-reaching reform in the Nigerian military. There is systemic corruption in the Nigerian military, procuring arms and equipment and recruitment. The Nigerian military is also understaffed, and the personnel are poorly trained. Most defense experts would agree that because of the coup culture of the 70s, 80s, and even the 90s, the military has slowed down on the training of its top officers and consistently retires promising and ambitious officers. The Defense Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON), a military-industrial complex, has been moribund and hence cannot meet the demands of the Military and local law enforcement. There is, hence, a need to rely on foreign nations for arms and ammunition and security consulting. This should not be the case.

Comparative analysis of military interventions in the politics of both Pakistan and Nigeria. From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the main reasons for military interventions are similar in both countries. Electoral fraud and malpractices happened to have been a significant source of discontent in the populace in Pakistan and Nigeria, which eroded the popularity of parties and politicians. It was one of the reasons that contributed to the downfall of the first civilian governments in 1966 and 1983 in Nigeria and 1977 in Pakistan. However, this could not explain the military's intervention in Pakistan politics in 1958 since elections were not held. However, politicians were grouping and regrouping to form governments without seeking a mandate from the electorates. The military interventions in the politics of both nations were in the form of a peaceful transition in Pakistan in all the coups of 1953, 1977, and 1999, as no bloodshed was recorded. However, when it comes to Nigeria, it was the exact opposite. In the 1966 coups, the first one in January, the federal Prime Minister and provincial Prime Ministers for Northern and Western regions, Abu-Bakr T. Balewa, Ahmadu Bell, and Ladoke



Akintola, respectively, were killed, and several military officers. In the coup that followed, the head of state, then Major General J.T.U Aguiyi Ironsi, was killed.

Bad governance in the form of corruption and political harassment provided legitimate grounds for the military to come into politics. However, corruption was a big issue facing the Nigerian civilian government in the 1960s. In the second civilian government of Shagari (1979 to 1983), corruption continues at all grassroots levels in Nigerian society, especially in the government sector. General Abacha disgraced the Nigerian Armed Forces, and he further corrupted other officers in his government, followed by President Obasanjo, who took power in 1999 as a civilian authority; after three years in power, established anti-corruption team called {EFCC} but Obasanjo himself involved in the act of corruption, President Yar'Adua was an excellent example for good governance, who declared his assets before he became president in general elections in 2007, laid down seventh agenda, but died soon as he assumed the power, Good luck Jonathan who was vice president became Nigeria president in 2010, Nigerians experienced lousy governance, insecurity, corruption, kidnapping, in his regime, this lead to powerful extremist {Boko haram} the so-called Islamist group denial western education, elections or democracy government in the country. Boko haram gained international recognition in April 2014 and kidnapped more than 230 school girls in the northern part of Nigeria, so President Good Luck became unpopular later. Among Significance in Pakistan's politics during the Nawaz's time before his overthrow in 1999. However, recorded literature talks nothing about corruption before the 1958 military interventions in Pakistan, and few traces are attributed to the regime when Z.A. Bhutto was in power.⁷² Political harassment and intimidation formed the order of the day for politicians in power against their rivals in the opposition in both countries.

CONCLUSION

One of the significant reasons for military intervention in Pakistan and Nigeria's politics was the politicization of the Army. Following the independence of both Pakistan and Nigeria, almost all the regions in both Pakistan and Nigeria seek to take total control of the military to use it as a weapon over other regions. The Nigerian army was seriously politicized to the extent that appointments and promotions were based on tribe and political sentiments rather than seniority and merit. It largely contributed to why the military intervened in Pakistan and Nigeria after independence. Scholars attest that the leaders of the different regions of Pakistan and Nigeria used the military at that time to profit themselves or their regions alone. It was basically why military intervention in Nigeria was frequent. Therefore, both brotherly countries share some political similarities and dissimilarities. The following points can be mentioned as significant reasons for the intervention of both these two countries in their political arena:

- a. Politicization of the Army
- b. Lack of free and fair election
- c. Regional and tribal-based political party
- d. Regional difference
- e. Corruption
- f. Political Ambition of the Military
- g. Inflation of Population
- h. Foreign Influence

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